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ETHICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF 
KIERKEGAARD’S PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM 
ABSTRACT
Starting with the point of freedom being one of unavoidable ideas of 
existential philosophy, as well as philosophy in general, we shall consider 
ethical and ontological aspects of contemplation of freedom in Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy. We deem that existential philosophy, “contemplated” in all 
its variations, represents the very horizon or manner of philosophical 
comprehension of freedom phenomena, where freedom is integrally 
observed, thus allowing us to talk about unique bliss of ontological and 
ethical dimension, both of those appearing to be equally important. 
Therefore, freedom dominates the Kierkegaard’s determination of 
individual, co-determines all its leap stages but also continually makes 
possible the sense of human existence.  
Specificity of Kierkegaard’s Contemplation of Freedom
Syntagma stating that self-imposed limitations represent realisation of my free-
dom (Svendsen 2014: 242), discloses the frame or advice for perceiving freedom 
nowadays. Subjectively accessing just small number of thinkers, consciously 
and deliberately, Svendsen considered freedom in its three manifestations, on-
tological, political and ethical, thus desiring to approximate his own consider-
ation to readers with no philosophical education (background). In our opinion, 
this opens Svendsen towards the horizon of existential comprehension of free-
dom, woven on individual self-structuring in the atmosphere of never-ending 
process of defining the term freedom.
Kierkegaard’s philosophy, summed up as a score of various life forms (Zim-
mer 2011: 151), poetically speaking, represents the most vivid horizon of contem-
plation of freedom. Generally observed, in the context of existential thinking, 
one could say that the freedom appears simultaneously with truth, and that as 
those faithful topics that permeate philosophy from its beginning. At the same 
time, they can be talked about as terms treated by the philosophical thinking 
the most, and consequently the most emptied of meaning that could be de-
noted as existentially conditional, i.e. life denoted area of understanding. The 
reason for it is certainly the fact that those terms are dealt by the philosophy 
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as its foundations and without them one cannot speak about serious thinking, 
i.e. one cannot talk about man’s reality. 
The thought situation is somewhat more favourable when it comes to truth 
(Filipovic 1989: 155–157), but not in a sense that philosophy ended up with 
truth, on the contrary. Spectrum of philosophical paradigms devoted to truth 
ranges from antique, i.e. classic theory of adequacy or correspondence to the-
ory of record and coherence, and if wishing to think historically, then the very 
pluralism of truth, as a characteristic of post-modern thinking, points out to 
an unfinished matter as life is, poetically speaking: i.e. to each curious spirit, 
the consideration of truth is revealed as a necessity of overrunning the actu-
al situation. Without explaining in details, we could say that, in this context, 
the consideration of truth is revealed in more favourable situation, due to the 
denotion that existential thought places truth alongside with freedom which 
is nothing else then man’s ownness, the Kierkegaard’s individuality which is 
actually ontological oppositeness between individual and crowd. We make 
remarks about truth so the freedom does not come down to subjective and 
voluntarist line because, as ontologically and ethically as we may observe the 
freedom validity area, along with the truth it has to be truthful to the extent 
that can be understandable for another man, even if the extent is possibility 
of accepting the other man’s freedom. Since it seems that Kierkegaard’s con-
ceptual determination for an individual, not the subject, is based on this think-
ing bliss, we shall say something about that too. Firstly, Kierkegaard is mis-
aligned with ruling philosophical “ideology” in every way, primarily with that 
of Hegel, so his individuality hides what an abstract subject cannot possess: 
he is not allowed, for the general, higher cause. Secondly, individual stands in 
the midst of a crowd, opposite and despite of it, draining freedom as a condi-
tion and possibility of self in that very relation.  Because the aim in existen-
tialism is individual human situation just because it is presented in the form 
of climate appropriate for becoming an individual and, for a thinking man 
and his existence, that individuality is presented as an objective thing within 
subjectivity, solid soil and inseparable feature from the essence of a being it-
self. Therefore, freedom is limited boundlessness of a being. And it seems to 
have been like that forever, with certain boundaries caused by the diversity of 
time, experience and space.  It could even be argued that perception of free-
dom is irrelevant, in metaphorical and ontological key, if the task is only con-
ceptual description. Because with elders (Filipovic 1989: 304–306), or two of 
the greatest, we find familiar twinning of the term of freedom which forks in 
two, visible in each subsequent contemplation of freedom. According to Plato, 
freedom is defined within an idea of justice realised by an ideal state, there-
fore such ideal determination of freedom is reflected in a thought that every-
one does what is his belonging capability; hence the freedom is presented as 
an internal determination within the man’s infatuation with an ideal. Aristotle 
perceives freedom in a more systemic way, in dialectic three-steps, differen-
tiating ontological determination of freedom according to which a man lives 
for his own sake and is determined by self-purpose, and ethical, leaned against 
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ontological where the choice of good and realistic things for a man matters. 
The frame of political determination is also determined in his contemplation 
of freedom, considered through actualisation of ontological and moral free-
dom as a social system in which an individual achieves the greatest fulfilment 
and it also seems that Hegel’s receptive determination of state is not far from 
this syntagma. Therefore, if the freedom, at one level, is an ontological term 
that “describes” the very essence of a man, then, on the other level, ontic or 
factual level freedom1 (Reese 1996: 242–244) may be represented through at 
least four ways that cover the variation in one of implementation areas what 
is also shown in several tens of various theories within these four ways. This 
“goes” simply because a man is the only being in the nature who is not com-
plete in his inner, deepest determination, or at least significantly, a being de-
termined by the necessity of the outer, laws of nature, but realises himself in 
the openness and the harmony with the outer world. Besides all other con-
clusions, this reveals what could be identified as a common feature which is 
nothing but conceptual elusiveness of freedom.
Ethical Dimension of Freedom
Starting from the previous section, to us it seems advisable that, instead of an 
attempt to determine the freedom by a definition, what is mainly pointless, to 
set our presentation of freedom thinking through the Kierkegaard’s Coperni-
can turn (Aumann 2008: 169), visible due to diffuse use of pseudonym. Let us 
remind that the purpose of pseudonym is, inter alia, determined as a way of 
overcoming the inability to communicate the subjectivistically located truth to 
another2. Since this is where the hint is for solving the truth subjectivity rid-
dle that could be comprehended by another individual, the situation is part-
ly explained in the following attitude: “Kierkegaard understood the world as 
the sphere of the creative activity of God. He took very seriously the fundamen-
tal biblical theme that God creates the universe through speech. Everything that 
exists does so because God is speaking it into existence. The human soul is that 
unique place in all of nature where the voice of God can be heard and respond-
ed to consciously” (Bellinger, internet).3 Therefore, the turn here refers to the 
problem of understanding the truth, meaning the equivalence between a man 
and freedom, as a subjective source of truth inside the relation which is nec-
essarily directed towards the absolute but only a part of that relation; there-
fore, the truth is inside an individual, in the spirit transcended by God, but 
1  Terms freedom and liberty are separated in meaning lately so the first one refers to 
the situation of choice, whereas latter covers political-social area with no limitations 
and which is as such acknowledged to the members of society.
2  For more details see Preface of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death, Serbian edi-
tion (Kjerkegor, Seren (1980), Bolest na smrt, Beograd, Mladost). I think that Zurovacs 
stance is mainly directed to this basic ontological news in relation to traditional 
philosophy.
3  Bellinger’s essay „Kierkegaard: Copernicus of the Spirit”.
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inside-me who understands myself as another towards the general crowd which 
is subsequently the origin of truth  as a result of Individual’s self-appointment. 
Hence, Kierkegaard finds the outcome of truth in self-appointment as an In-
dividual thus pointing at the truth determination turn as a problem of convey-
ing that truth to another (besides that gnoseological location of truth within 
the subject) but also as a problem of comprehending the source of freedom. 
Generally speaking, this is hereby implied as a core determination with a hint 
of dominance, ideas of freedom as identified with a man-individual, by no 
means through leaning on the sophistic source of the well-known measure of 
all things, out of which everything would subsequently end in an unreachable 
ideal of a man-standard, but as a determination that the man himself is free-
dom. Besides the fact that Kierkegaard nohow belongs to the circle of western 
relativism, one should bear in mind that he, in his idiomatic way, nominates 
matters of thinking significantly different with the request that the sense of 
the world must be measured by freedom and individual’s self-awareness, that 
of a specific individual, thus diagnosing the crisis of a contemporary man and 
his world expressed in the syntagma of turning the existing way of thinking 
“upside down”. This is yielded by the thesis that the basis for the aforemen-
tioned relativism lies in the statement that there are two opposite statements 
in every matter. So the freedom thinking is ultimately diffusely determined, 
what is more clearly visible in ethical than ontological treatment of freedom. 
Kierkegaard’s consideration of freedom phenomena is placed within the com-
plete opus as one implied thinking concept of freedom of an individual. Here-
by is emphasized that the freedom was subject to philosophical thinking since 
its beginnings, but not so passionately and with such a cry for sense as it was 
done in existentialism. It can be said that is locus of freedom placed in indi-
vidual. Therefore, naming freedom perception implied, means to us freedom 
of thinking as a constituent of an individual in all its states; or as a determi-
nation that separates the individual, in the existence, from any other being; 
or as an existence itself within the deepest determination of an individual.  If 
knowing that Kierkegaard resented to Hegel freedom as recognition of necessi-
ty, what is nothing more than reconciliation of an individual with the fact the 
he is not the end purpose but abstract historical process, we hereby meet the 
very moment where the freshness of his perception of freedom arises. I.e., the 
intersection point refers to the ontological unity of the person that is not a 
true person if not a free person, so it is not an individual but an abstract sub-
ject in the World spirit network. There, where the necessity rules, no freedom 
resides; necessities we recognise in the nature or logic are not opposed to the 
freedom of personality because they simply do not reside in the same place. In 
an anagogic way, Kierkegaard contemplates the truth of a being by responding 
to the classic abstract idealism, later scientific, constantly systemic, with the 
request …it should immediately be borne in mind that the issue is not about the 
truth of Christianity but about the individual’s relation to Christianity (Kierke-
gaard 1992: 15). If it wasn’t like this, the delusions of the system would remain, 
i.e. the Christianity developed alongside and got established as a system that 
DIMENSION OF KIERKEGAARD’S PERCEPTION OF FREEDOM614 │ Jugoslav vuk Tepić
neglects the truth so sought after by Kierkegaard. In his most general meta-
phor, the place of truth is thereby shown, hence the individual in its search for 
the truth as an inner relation, whereas the existential thinking uses terms basic 
for idealism, but with one key difference. Therefore, we quote Kierkegaard:
The term being in those definitions must, then, be understood much more ab-
stractly as the abstract rendition or the abstract prototype of what being in 
concreto is as empirical being. If it is understood in this way, nothing stands 
in the way of abstractly defining truth as something finished, because, viewed 
abstractly, the agreement between thinking and being is always finished, inas-
much as the beginning of the process of becoming lies precisely in the concre-
tion that abstraction abstractly disregards. (Kierkegaard 1992: 190) 
It is totally understandable that word disregard comprises nothing but con-
ceptual generalisation of life, elimination of determining and unpredictable 
moments that disturb dialectic regularity of the System, all thought to be, by 
Kierkegaard, opposition of freedom because it is necessity for an individual 
and thus freedom opposite. 
As it is clearly indicated in each of his records, Kierkegaard places the area 
of freedom inside the personality, amongst personal choices and commitments, 
where Hegel’s dialectic mediation bears no power since it rules fantastic beings 
(Kierkegaard 1992: 191)4, therefore his dialectics of inside has no denial nature 
in its development; so if wanting to speak “more freely” we shall say that, as 
for Kierkegaard, assumption, sometimes assumptions, or the preceding one, 
retain in existence by following the regularity remembering the future observed 
in the past since his perception of freedom retains existential character of a 
being meaning that every existence is personal for a man. So, as an example 
or a situation that creates the atmosphere of understanding for the reader, he 
uses what is the oldest in European man’s memory, a Bible with its tales; on 
the other hand, he explains himself by means of Socrates. He links freedom 
to the original liberation of Adam from the natural all-union, unawareness of 
the own being that reaches the humanity being through such a dramatic fate 
as the original, forefathers’ sin; because that is when a man attains possibili-
ty of freedom as, up to that moment, asleepness of spirit through detachment 
from fore-unity, fore-awareness. That Kierkegaard’s perception of freedom 
is on the other side of every historical movement’s necessity, where objectiv-
ity of the very thought has no utter sense; the internal sphere created by en-
deavour to realise complete and identity being. That gives the hint of kind of 
freedom. Being presented as same-by-itself, between freedom and personal-
ity, through the realised moment, but also as insufficiency of the becoming, 
we come to freedom as a need for constant becoming, realisation of infinity in 
finite.  Hence, generally speaking, it is possible to say that Kierkegaard’s free-
dom is implied, since it is present along with the truth, i.e. its omnipresence 
4  Here is more explicit criticism of the purpose of Hegel’s books from we took cer-
tain part, paraphrased.
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is initially shown as human being’s dream, as a selection which is a condition 
for every future choice an individual makes. Therefore, in order to show live-
lihood of the choice, it is being thoroughly, pseudonymously and logically (Ki-
erkegaard 1987: 431) thought within the category of choice (he himself would 
say it was his only category) showing that, when an individual makes a choice, 
it is the absolute choice because the choice is not this and that materialisti-
cally, but absolute own self in an eternal validity, i.e., the choice can be under-
stood as a solution for possibilities that ultimately have the same argumenta-
tion value (MacIntyre 1998: 140). Thereby we come to the ontological unity of 
my own self and freedom. Reasonableness, or something by which this unity 
means retention from both in the third, i.e. freedom in its emphasis as eternity 
of possibilities, is Kierkegaard’s most abstract matter in thinking of freedom. 
At the same time it is the most specific thought of freedom at the moment of 
realisation. I.e. freedom as the realisation in the same-by-itself of myself and 
the absolute; I am when I choose myself, because I choose in the absolute sense, 
and I choose absolute just with what I chose, I do not choose this or that and ab-
solute is my own self in an eternal validity (Kierkegaard 1987: 432). Further on, 
Kierkegaard speaks about one significant difference between the aesthetic and 
ethical individual, main difference that everything revolves about, difference that 
explains it all and that is simplicity handed out to the reader, with anticipated 
caution, over anonymous pseudonym.  That significant bauble is that ethical 
individual is transparent to itself and does not live “randomly”, as it is the case 
with aesthetic individual (Kierkegaard 1987: 578). Placing all this in a debate 
called Equilibrium Between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in the Composition of 
Personality, Kierkegaard actually subordinates all individual’s abilities to that 
unique objective, complete personality who is inside itself same as the freedom.
Ontological Dimension of Freedom
It would be hard to shed light on freedom in an ethical sense, just conditional-
ly or temporarily differentiated from ontological, without describing the pre-
vious condition, or better to say state, but of the kind recognised as setting. In 
fact, freedom, as hidden man’s essence just briefly grazed as ultimate ideal in 
every day’s perception, remains condition aspired to by a man in a peculiarly 
confusing way, ambiguously, actually as irony has the thought relate to pure 
thoughtfulness. So, freedom fits a man, surely as a value of an abstract ideal 
that cannot be reached, or hardly reached, by means of revolution; and then 
it stands wrong, although it serves as a proof of effort, general aspiration or 
omnipresence and, thereby, haziness of freedom.  Hence it is harder to find 
conventionality in Kierkegaard’s perception of freedom, but as a confirma-
tion of omnipresence, one can find similar banality of preceding state, open-
ing for freedom efflux. There is a special setting in place for his perception of 
freedom, special inner relation expressed in certain existential character of a 
sinner. That condition, setting, is anxiety shown in his psychological work, 
called “The Concept of Anxiety”. The whole debate is based on the postulate 
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that points out to the basics, that Kierkegaard’s man is the synthesis of infin-
ity and finite, transient and eternal, freedom and necessity, in short: synthesis 
(Najdanović 2009: 69). That synthesis appears to be a problem for existential 
determination, which is not surprising because anxiety is considered a state, 
present in both of man’s united poles as an insinuated state which is announced 
as potential before as well as after opening the possibility, so it can be treated 
as a warning, signalling feature of a man’s inside. Therefore, anxiety points 
towards the possibility of freedom, towards its appearance. Possibility, now 
as a category with reference to category of choice, is of another kind, there-
fore, after psychology makes an initial step in elaboration of anxiety, we en-
ter dogmatism, although we are only interested here in the part that concern 
freedom; and awareness of oneself, self-awareness. For him, to be educated 
in possibility means to be prepared for communication which is relation with 
self as an absolute; to be ready to open self towards the absolute is turning to-
wards the eternity, which is nothing but freedom of individual from delusions 
of the World, realisation of oneself as Existence. Equality of faith and thought 
is self-explanatory, but as a passion. One who is formed by possibility, is formed 
by its eternity (Kierkegaard 1980: 138). With Kierkegaard, one should be aware 
of the specific environment due to dialectic line, the unity attained by interflu-
ence and interlacing of anxiety, possibility and eternity, which, as a dialectic 
triad which is not that because the previous is not denied, points to the victim 
direction. As it will turn out, Kierkegaard’s relation towards the concept of 
the victim is self-denying, even in the sense that his thinking denies, puts the 
thinking, reasonable part of the personality in the second place. Therefore, 
one who is formed by anxiety, is formed by possibility and only he is formed 
by his eternity. Hereby we notice possessive-reflexive adjective one’s own as a 
passing point towards understanding what has been said, because eternity is 
primarily understood as a general category, feature of Absolute or God so it is 
necessary to pay attention and attempt to see what personal, one’s own eternity 
is in the matter. Since the first characteristic of possibility is that everything is 
equally possible in possibility (Kierkegaard 1980: 139). They are between noth-
ing and reality. Being of possibility is that it can always be but only if it can be 
borne by the internal potential of personality. This is not outside of reflection 
on freedom, on the contrary. One may say that, instead of constantly aspiring 
to repack the world that would create chaos, a man should direct himself to 
the truth travelling through personal self-realisation because personality be-
comes that unique absolute, and hence the free personality is its own goal. So, 
the personal self-realisation is the base point from where we can change the 
world, whereas free personality is only true reality and there somewhere is the 
constant or basic truth that Kierkegaard conveys to us. 
If perceived historically, with Kierkegaard, realisation of freedom rests on 
life, experienced moments, biographic reminiscences he uses to shed light on 
most of his concepts. It is also the case with freedom in the context of his be-
loved Regina, who is so much more significantly important for Kierkegaard 
than their engagement can be spoken about as a biographical reminiscence from 
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two people’s lives, even in cases when it leaves a deep trace in souls. Regina is 
actually as important as the paradigm of father, as seeking the true Christiani-
ty; to be more specific, significance is shown in experiencing the possibility to 
renounce something valuable for the most precious value. It is so in perception 
of freedom, because freedom reveals itself in renunciation, i.e., victimisation 
that leads towards the absolute. The thought of such renunciation without ex-
periencing is manifested as pointless in many Kierkegaard’s sentences. Here-
by we shall only point out to some, more vividly and lively communicated. So, 
My relation to her is one small paragraph we find in Diary (Kierkegaard 2013: 
188–189). Even before that paragraph he endlessly contemplates and unwinds 
each moment, each encounter, gesture, different acts within same situation; 
comprehensiveness. However, in this paragraph he speaks of major guilt for 
pursuing her and dragging her along. Any ordinary man would say about himself 
that regret occurred, however, through five cycles Kierkegaard here elaborates 
particular significant relational moments of cognition and emotions, emotion-
al self-development and immediacy of interior through suffer with no hint of 
an end. Dialectically, he speaks of “her” in seven episodes; two of which are 
augmented, one as an ultimatum, second one as a crucial step. Ontologically, 
relation is shedding light on inner being, reaching unmediated reflection. Ex-
istentially, it is about sacrificing ethical for religious. There is indirect speech 
used on another place (Kierkegaard 2013: 118). Johannes writes to Cordelia, and 
as he does that, he is already aestheticizing. Thereby the female existence is ex-
istence for another, and it reflects in maiden which is such only in relation to a 
man.  This is ontological matter by all means, i.e., by determining existence, 
whereas empirically, thus ethically, there is confusion because seldom one finds 
a woman who would be something else. Simply, breaking an engagement for 
Kierkegaard is a sacrifice same as the one, standard-like, that Abraham, once 
upon a time, left to a man, but a man to whom Kierkegaard allocates a mission 
thus making him newly-revealed type; not some new, still non-existent man, 
super-man, but the very existing one, concrete, with a sacrifice mission, the 
one who builds own self through despair and anxiety thus making it possible 
to exist in one new, self-awareness-full meaning. 
And every time when it comes to contemplation of freedom, there is a dis-
cussion on choice, either-or, which in philosophical perception of time, does 
not see oppositeness as a problem because philosophy treats time as past time, 
history, which is future for freedom, still non-existent but determining as a pos-
sibility not to be if missing a choice. My either-or firstly means a choice that is 
chosen by, what is chosen comes second, i.e. choosing between two suggestions 
is less significant in relation to choosing volition (Kierkegaard 1987: 431). The 
thing is that two spheres have been usually equated, speculative thinking and 
freedom, hence many difficulties arise in presenting freedom as reality, i.e. part 
of existence. A specific man is “not interested” in Hegel’s sphere of necessity, 
which is reasonable because it is part of world’s mind, where oppositeness does 
not create problem, i.e. where mediation has its place; Kierkegaard’s directs 
us towards the inner sphere of personality where either-or has determining 
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meaning, where historical necessity has no influence on the freedom of an in-
dividual because freedom is eternal and arises from nothing (Kierkegaard 1980: 
94). With Kierkegaard necessity is reflected through sin, and the aim is on un-
realised essence of a being as the greatest sin, since it blocks other constitu-
tive characteristics of an individual, from freedom to truth. Further on, in his 
book “The Concept of Anxiety” he contemplates sin, another non-philosophic 
category, very systematically, thus unusual for his opus, bringing immediate 
presentation of freedom as a subject of contemplation for psychology as “com-
petent” discipline with its own, certain legalities related to the psychological 
sphere. Surely, as it is clearly noted in Introduction, psychology is here in Ki-
erkegaard’s conceptual scope and understanding the subject, so, inter alia, for 
this reason, this book is marked as filled with philosophy (at least by Heideg-
ger) and it is usually marked as the most difficult book (Bertman 1990: 117). 
In an anxiety everyone is returning to own relation to Absolute, so the anxiety 
could not be observed conventionally psychologically, but for Kierkegaard it 
is as Mind or Logos are for Hegel (Kierkegaard 1980: 37). Psychological finds 
limit and inability in a specific setting where anxiety is vertigo of freedom that 
appears because the spirit wishes to continue synthesis, and freedom, infatuated 
with its own possibility, catches that moment of infinity and clings onto it (Ki-
erkegaard 1980:59). Sartre points out that Kierkegaard in this work presents the 
essential difference between various types of anxiety, such as: anxiety as a fear 
of unknown patness of my being, anxiety of future, as a field full of un-light-
ened past and anxiety as bare, plain fear which is not a true anxiety because 
it refers to immediate and objective danger. Accepting determining Kierkeg-
aard’s attitudes in contemplation of anxiety, Sartre calls the first one anxiety 
from oneself, whereas fear, but not ordinary ever-day fear, is different because 
it determines the feeling of a being in the world (Sartre 1966: 29).
Definition of freedom is affirmed, definition which is not that in the strict 
sense of perception, as a possibility of the possible, but also the power of being 
able to do so, because if the freedom is really motion of reflection in itself, then 
these two possibilities of freedom are actually only one and the same possibili-
ty-like itself and the mirror image of reflection (Todorović 2001: 105). We dis-
tance from this statement, i.e. to define freedom here would mean to remain at 
conceptual which does not open the very possibility of doing, leap that turns 
eternal possibilities into possible, current and becoming. Simply because an 
individual man, Kierkegaard’s contemporary, with his incorporation into the 
existing forms of human existence, meaning social and individual occurrenc-
es, he is opposed to free personality, existent being that chooses itself. Kierke-
gaard aims at individuality that is courageous to accept itself truly, seemingly 
in a way that rejects temptation, “Adam-like” example that opens qualitatively 
new possibility from Nothing through elimination of natural. That certainly 
implies revolution as true elimination of the existing order, which is natural 
in its fore-sample and rational in all latter cases. There is no way it could be 
achieved by disintegration of the current order by some social, politically in-
duced revolutions, this is primarily about the personal and rare courage to start 
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and enlighten processes inside an individual that would lead to the essential 
reconstruction of a being, cease of unhuman living. That is primarily condi-
tioned by questions of the truth of a being and simultaneously its freedom. Ki-
erkegaard’s question of truth is primarily a question of existential truth which 
means it is not about historically cognitive knowledge, but about ways of ex-
istence, confessions, through which an individual does not necessarily debate 
any factual, historical consistencies but significantly differently conveys the 
way of his search for the sense of own life and the way of illuminating those facts 
through this search  (Životić 1973: 44). So it is clear that Kierkegaard’s truths 
are illuminating and not explanatory what doesn’t means that he doesn’t con-
trovert or contemplate objectivity and materialism as frame of existence for a 
free man, but, as we have indicated, he emphasizes specific, always personal 
dimension, effort to be made in the direction of discussed despair and omni-
present anxiety through which an individual gains its absolute of using free-
dom, which is proportional to potential, incognitive and immanent to an in-
dividual man. The special emphasis is on bilateral relation between us and the 
truth, created in the simultaneous attention that objective truth, if detached 
from my existence, could not be spoken about because it simply cannot be in 
such way, and on the other hand, my inner, spiritual life must be connected to 
outer, objective world so it isn’t insanity, just like even greater insanity is the 
objective one, not linked with the spirit. 
Kierkegaard wrote many pages in order to “disclose” traditional philosophi-
cal abstraction of a man; it primarily refers to Hegel’s magnificent work named 
System, hence System with  capital S, cause Kierkegaard takes it personally, 
everything other in traditional philosophy is less clumsy or more human re-
lated to inexcusable deed to create pan-logical scientific system out of antique 
love for wisdom. The truth in the System is process-historical, mediated, triad 
dialectic and presented as senior and essential, so the attention of Kierkeg-
aard is directed to pointing out to excessive objectivity and unbiased concern; 
because what is this philosophy that eliminates a man, not caring about his 
entire being. Therefore, Kierkegaard seeks grounds in well-known places, at 
least for Christians (as an exponent and denial of a trapped man), for which he, 
maybe, too often used to use biblical syntagmas and motives as a well-known 
surrounding for his reader. If he was to use the same language to communi-
cate to everybody, he would not be understood not even to the least extent, 
and understanding him is opinion of the reader about own self so the philos-
ophy in his thinking should be a tool for our own being or it itself is nothing, 
i.e. it is then totally useless and hence his great effort would be meaningless. 
So, there where the necessity rules instead of freedom, where the truth is ob-
jective, necessary and mediated instead of unmediated, subjective-life aware, 
then individual is not being and there is no existence without it. That explains 
Kierkegaard’s passionate opposition to Hegel’s contradiction in which the final 
being has a role of a “tool” in realising the objective purpose of the truth and 
calling it all philosophy of freedom. Questioning himself and us about freedom 
as a condition of truth, and vice versa, Kierkegaard firstly asks if a man may 
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put his head on the block for the truth? The question arises as the preceding 
one, but simultaneously as a hypothesis he uses to involve us in a discussion on 
the relation between a man and truth, as a necessary situation testing process 
thus testing an individual. In his usual style, Kierkegaard here, using concepts 
that are not really concepts from the philosophical point of view, actually puts 
the reader in a position to be involved in a discussion what makes his initial 
questioning resemble Socratic method, also known as maieutics. Although, 
one should bear in mind an opposite option, such as Životić’s  final remarks, 
illustrational for the logic they use. Hereby we mean a kind of return to Hegel 
that seems to be an unusual verdict to the existential thinking. “Kierkegaard 
wanted free individual without free community. Hence an individual can only 
remain in the world of necessity without real possibility to express own personal 
strengths, without possibility to get realised as a free being.” (Životić 1973: 48). 
Therefore, in the sense of disagreeing with the previous assessment, the starting 
point of Kierkegaard’s philosophy could be an assumption that freedom is not 
attainable philosophically since every argumentation would then be “caught in 
the network” of logical necessity thus reaching direct contradiction with free-
dom, exclusively attainable through spiritual endeavour through such state of 
mind in which anxiety pervades the whole being, explained in Kierkegaard’s 
psychology as own subject and which opens up possibility for freedom. Still, 
philosophical is partly interwoven with Kierkegaard’s psychological, at least 
as an auxiliary tool but also as logically necessary reason. Therefore, Kierke-
gaard devotes his work, philosophical in teaching, poetical in language and 
form, to anxiety, because an individual does not exist without freedom which 
is not such without anxiety as a precondition in which seeker exercises for the 
final self-cognition.
Conclusion
What could be ending words at this article when we know that Kierkegaard, 
by denying philosophical path, actually denies the conceptual exclusiveness as 
an “addle” way to illuminate something belonging to each man? Kierkegaard’s 
thought teaches us- necessity of freedom is possible without philosophical, 
whereas vice versa does not make sense.  In that atmosphere, we deem that 
making conclusions about freedom can be done in the horizon of basic ori-
entation of existential thinking as primarity of existence over essence, where 
freedom appears such us deepest truth of Individual. Therefore, primary for 
a man is whatever is lively, existential, pervasive, of flesh and blood, breath 
embraced, recognised through freedom, comprehended as freedom. Freedom 
as a feeling, atmosphere and suffering of existence or freedom as a paradox of 
a being that lives limited existence as becoming with inner projection of lim-
itless and unfinished as always in-motion, im-perfect finalisation of the own 
purpose. Hence inability to separate and differentiate ethical and ontological 
in Kierkegaard’s philosophy.
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Resume: Ethical and ontological dimension of contemplation of freedom 
in Kierkegaard’s philosophy direct towards the unique horizon of self-appoint-
ment of an individual. Just like the existential philosophy generally represents 
the specific form of philosophical perception of freedom in which the freedom 
is comprehensively considered, also with Kierkegaard these two dimensions 
cannot be observed separately. Ethical dimension of freedom is presented not 
only in the ethical manner of existence, but as a capability of generalisation 
and relation to the world.  Ontological dimension is not only in the question 
what is the essence of an individual but also in what needs to be done to be-
come an individual. Hence it was necessary to present key aspects of Kierke-
gaard’s perception of freedom through systemic thinking and Christianity, on 
one hand, and inside his contemplation of an individual, on the other. Both 
dimensions imply constant questioning of conditions set before a man with 
the purpose of making him an individual, and within the paradox of existence 
as limited boundlessness. 
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Jugoslav Vuk Tepić
Etičke i ontološke dimenzije Kjerkegorovog poimanja slobode
Apstrakt
Polazeći od stava da je sloboda jedna od nezaobilaznih ideja egzistencijalne filozofije, ali i 
filozofije uopšte, razmatraćemo etičke i ontološke aspekte promišljanja slobode u Kjerkego-
rovoj filozofiji. Smatramo da egzistencijalna filozofija, promišljana u svim njenim varijantama, 
predstavlja onaj horizont ili način filozofskog poimanja fenomena slobode, u kome se slobo-
da misli integralno, pa se onda može govoriti o jedinstvenom patosu ontološke i etičke di-
menzije, gde se one pokazuju podjednako važnim. Sloboda tako dominira Kjerkegorovim 
određenjem pojedinca, sa-određuje sve skokovite etape ali i neprestano čini mogućim smi-
sao čovekovog bivstvovanja. 
Ključne reči: etičko, sloboda, moral, ontološko, pojedinac, egzistencijalna filozofija, poimanje 
slobode
